

Discussion paper on 'Discourse and Identity'¹
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Roxanne Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North/South Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), Introduction and Chapter 4.

Iver Neumann, 'Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy,' *Millennium*, 31:3, 2002, pp. 627-51.²

Ido Oren, *Our Enemies and US: America's Rivalries and the Making of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), Introduction and Conclusion

Introduction:

This discussion piece begins with brief descriptions of the works provided by Roxanne, Iver, and Ido. I highlight the basic arguments put forward by each author concerning discourse and identity, drawing some largely obvious comparisons and contrasts between and among them.³ Rather than launching critiques at these valuable analyses, I then orient the remainder of my discussion towards a wider set of theoretical issues, suggesting five directions in which I think the literature on discourse and identity might fruitfully be extended. (Some of these directions, as I note, are already prefigured in the writings before us.) The five directions are

- The 'uptake' or interpellation of discourses of identity.
- The analysis of popular rather than elite discourse of identity.
- The examination of the intertextuality of discourses of identity.
- The institutionalization of discourses of identity in bureaucratic institutions.
- The relationship of discourses of state identity to other discursive structures.

¹ This discussion paper was prepared for presentation at the conference 'Identity Matters...and How', Ohio State University, May 2003.

² Unfortunately, I have not had time carefully to consider Iver's 'From Meta to Method: The Materiality of Discourse' (ms, 2003).

³ I have focused only on the broad structure of the arguments relating to discourse and identity and apologize to the authors for all the subtleties that have been trampled!

Doty on Discourse and Identity

Roxanne's analysis of 'imperial encounters' and of 'Northern' constructions of the 'South' provides a clear argument about the nature of and relationship between discourse and identity. Inspired primarily by the work of Foucault and Derrida, Roxanne argues that 'the very identities of peoples, states, and regions are constructed through representational practices', through 'an economy of abstract binary oppositions that we routinely draw upon and that frame our thinking' (p. 2) and through the narratives (p. 3) constructed out of those economies. The identities with which she is concerned are Others, understood, most broadly, as regions such as the 'South' or the 'third world', more narrowly, as states such as Kenya and the Philippines, and most narrowly, as people like 'Filipinos' and the Huk. These Others are necessarily constructed in relations to the corresponding Self, whether the North or West, the U.S. or Great Britain, or Americans and English. In each case, identities are conceptualized as subject positions within a discourse: 'material objects and subjects are constituted as such in discourse' (p. 5). These subject positions are created through practices such as 'subject positioning' (Doty, 1993): in the case of U.S. intervention into the Huk Rebellion, for instance, the American and the Filipino were mutually constituted through the interconnections among core binary oppositions of reason/rationality and passion/emotion, the subsidiary binary of parent and child, and the core opposition of good versus evil.

In this analysis of imperial encounters, the powerful discourses, those with the strongest 'material and performative' (p. 5) effects, originate in the North, and specifically among Northern elites. It is 'policy makers, scholars, journalists, and others in the North' (p. 2) who engage in the representational practices constitutive of the subjects of the imperial encounter. The result is sometimes hegemony and always hierarchy. Hegemony, in this context, refers to the

constant and ultimately never completely successful attempt to fix the meanings established in the discourse so as to have a foundation against which to legitimate the authority of the North/U.S. (p. 8). Constructing the ‘South,’ that is, is as much, if not more, about constructing the ‘North,’ its power, its dominance, its rightness.

The results of this subject positioning -- through a variety of discursive practices such as classification, surveillance, negation, and so on – are twofold. There is, first, a hierarchical classification of peoples and states. The U.S. becomes the speaking, knowledgeable subject acting for the global good and characterized by stability, honesty, competence (p. 92). The Philippines become a chaotic, disorderly, corrupt and inept ‘third world state’ (p. 94). The corollary ‘warrants for action’ (Weldes, 1996: 282) are obvious: the U.S. is obliged to intervene to produce order, to tutor the childlike natives so that they may learn to emulate the practices of their betters. The basic model looks like this:

ELITE REPRESENTATION → SUBJECT POSITION/IDENTITY → ACTION MADE POSSIBLE

Oren on Discourse and Identity

Ido’s *Our Enemies and US*, while similar in many ways to Roxanne’s analysis, investigates the relationship between ‘the politics of U.S. foreign policy and the substance of [American] political science scholarship’ (p. 5). This work, less explicitly conceptual and methodological, offers a fascinating analysis of the ideology of the American discipline of political science. Ido’s questions are twofold: 1) is the identity or ‘self-image’ of American political science as both ‘objective’ (4), ‘detached’ (p. 5) or ‘value free’ (p. 7) and as partial to democratic values like freedom accurate, and 2) how can this inconsistent self image be explained (p. 7). Identity appears in this analysis in two ways: first, as the self-image of the

discipline, and second, as ‘the characterization of the United States’ and of ‘America’s chief enemies in the twentieth century’ (p. 7).⁴ These two notions of identity are closely connected. Indeed, by tracing the connections between the changing representations of U.S. enemies in U.S. foreign policy and in U.S. political science – ‘in all cases the images presented by American political science became considerably darker (and substantially less similar to the image of the US) after the onset of the conflict’ (pp. 7-8) – Ido demonstrates that U.S. political science is a distinctly American discipline: it has a national rather than a scientific identity. To use some of Roxanne’s language, transformation in the representations of the enemy constructed in the discursive practices of the U.S. state as the result of conflict significantly transformed the representational practices of the discipline. The effect was the (re)production of the subject position of the discipline as a locus of hegemony, where particular, contestable meanings are (temporarily) fixed. The discipline, Ido concludes, is ideological: it ‘continually negotiate[s] the identity of the U.S. by way of direct or indirect comparisons with foreign regimes’ (p. 17) and ‘reflects successive reconstitutions of the identity of the US in relation to the identity of ‘Other’ states, especially those that became America’s chief enemy’ (p. 172). Discursively, then, the discipline serves the interests of U.S. state power.

A second(ary?) argument offered by Ido is that the ‘theoretical reimaginings’ characterizing the history of U.S. political science ‘were partly inspired by the active involvement of political scientists in America’s war efforts, as consultants, advisors, or ideological warriors in the service of the foreign policy agencies of the U.S. government’ (p. 8). Here the argument is extended beyond representational practices to include institutional,

⁴ It is sometimes unclear whether Ido is consistently working with a notion of identity as subject position in Roxanne’s and Iver’s sense. The language of ‘self-image,’ for example, connotes a more psychological than discursive conception.

bureaucratic practices as well (which are nonetheless discursive for that). For example, Ido investigates the career of Gabriel Almond, demonstrating not only that he often consulted for the U.S. state -- e.g., the Air University, the Office of Naval Research, RAND, and the Psychological Strategy Board of the White House – but that ‘[h]is scholarship was oriented to the American national security concerns and policies of his time, and his scholarly success was enmeshed with intelligence and psychological warfare work in the service of the U.S. government’ (p. 134). Ido’s analysis brings home, in a different way than does Roxanne’s, the nexus of power and knowledge. Those connected to certain bureaucratic institutions of the state, it makes clear, are likely to be able to wield discursive power in the discipline because ‘[i]n American cold-war era scholarship on political culture, the boundaries between the study of political culture and the politics of U.S. foreign policy were porous at best’ (p. 134).

Both of Ido’s lines of argument highlight the elitist character of these representations: representations by elites in the discipline (and specifically its most (in)famous practitioners) legitimize and reproduce those of elites in the U.S. foreign policy establishment (when the two are not already the same). The basic model of discourse and identity looks like this:⁵

REPRESENTATIONS OF IDENTITY BY → RERESENTATIONS OF IDENTITY → LEGITIMATION OF STATE IDENTITY
FOREIGN POLICY ELITES BY ACADEMIC ELITES
(WHO MIGHT BE ACADEMIC ELITES)

Neumann on Discourse and Identity

Iver’s paper diverges considerably from the other two. Through an ethnographic study of changing Norwegian diplomatic practices in the ‘High North’ after the cold war, he defends the

utility of a turn to ‘practices’ in the study of discourse and identity. Claiming that much discourse analysis is primarily linguistic and textual, he seeks to ‘bring’ neglected practices or action ‘back in’ (p. 629). ‘The analysis of discourse understood as the study of the preconditions for social action must include the analysis of practice understood as the study of social action itself’ (pp. 627-8): he thus wants ‘to re-combine the study of meaning with the study of practice’ (p. 630). This approach is grounded in a distinction between ‘narrative discourse,’ which provides the preconditions for action (p. 628) and entails the study of meaning (p. 630) – the focus of Roxanne’s and Ido’s work -- and the study of practices or social action, which takes material practice as the point of departure (p. 630) to generate ‘abstract and general accounts of incorporated and material patterns of action that are organized around the common implicit understandings of the actors’ (p. 629).⁶

Practices are ‘socialized patterns of action’ (p. 631) that engage dynamically with (narrative?) discourse⁷ to produce an always changing culture. Drawing on de Certeau, he argues that ‘repertoires of actions’ – learned by skilled actors -- are available to particular types of subjects in particular types of context (p. 633); for example, diplomatic practices are a repertoire of actions available to ‘diplomats’ in the context of their ‘diplomatic lives’ (pp. 639-40). Reflexively, discourse and practice inform each other through ‘stories’. Power, specifically ‘conceptual power,’ is the source of change: it establishes new practices or maintains old ones,


⁵ This model does not include the transformations wrought by war because I am interested here only in the discourse/identity relation. For the same reason, I have ignored the interesting argument about democracy.

⁶ An interesting question that I have no time to pursue here is the relation between this distinction and Foucault’s notion of ‘discursive practices,’ which I have always understood to include both of these ‘dimensions’ of discourse – the linguistic and non-linguistic practices discussed by Laclau and Mouffe (1987: 82-84).

⁷ Does the term ‘discourse’ come to stand in for ‘narrative discourse’ – for linguistic and textual practices -- as opposed to unmodified practices as ‘actions’?

thus determining the field of discourse (p. 636) and subject positions, as well as possible actions.

The main model, it seems to me, is⁸



Iver applies this conceptual apparatus to the recent transformation of Norwegian diplomacy in the ‘High North’. Here, after the cold war, ‘the possibility of creating new practices opened up’ (p. 640) between Norway and the Soviet Union. Put much too succinctly, the narrative is as follows: In the Norwegian Department of Policy Planning and Research a ‘story’ was developed of (potential) post-cold war cooperation in the Barents Sea region conducted relatively independently of the national foreign policy apparatus in Norway. This story ‘narrated into existence’ a ‘social field’ on which new practices, attached to new subject positions, could emerge (p. 640). ‘The stories construct a new subject position for use locally – that of the “almost diplomat” flanking the diplomat – and offer scripts for how to act in relation to Russian colleagues, under the supervision of the fully-fledged diplomat’ (p. 646). The new subjects – local and regional representatives as ‘almost diplomats’ – could now engage in international diplomacy. These new practices generated resistance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose power was being challenged; the result was an accommodation between the innovative practices of the new regional diplomacy – the stories, practices, and subject positions -- and the SOP’s of the central bureaucracy.⁹ In the end, there was a real change in diplomatic practices -- the empowerment of sub-state actors in the national arena and a new relationship

⁸ My depiction of Iver’s model clearly diverges from his own!

⁹ Does the analysis here become quite similar to conventional bureaucratic politics?

between local and national politics; but this was accompanied by the reproduction of the ‘more deeply embedded precondition for action that the bureaucratic line of command should be adhered to’ (p. 644). A new practice was improvised, albeit within the confines of the master discourse of national-level diplomacy.

Some Possible Extensions of these Analyses of Discourse and Identity

As the work of these three authors illustrates, discourse analysis in IR offers a truly ‘vibrant research programme’ (Milliken, 1999: 248). Each of these authors provides an important argument about and apparatuses for conceptualizing the nature of and the relationship between discourse and identity. None, thankfully, collapses the analysis of either discourse or identity into a (neo-)positivist ‘variable,’ instead (largely) treating the relations between discourse and identity as constitutive rather than causal. Building on these analyses, I want to suggest five ways (there are many others, of course) in which we can expand on or extend these analyses.¹⁰

1. ‘Uptake’ or interpellation of discourses of identity

One of the things largely missing from all three of these works is an explicit concern with the ‘uptake’ of discursive constructions by their audiences. How, for instance, did ‘Northern’ publics, ‘Southern’ elites, or ‘Southern’ publics relate to the representations of Filipinos that made possible the U.S. imperial encounter with the Huk rebellion? At least two lines of argument suggest themselves.

¹⁰ I am suggesting these as directions for a community effort, not as blue prints for singular analyses encompassing all of these dimensions at once.

One might, first, deploy a concept like interpellation.¹¹ Interpellation refers to a dual process whereby identities or subject-positions are created and, more importantly here, concrete individuals are ‘hailed’ into (Althusser, 1971: 174) or interpellated by them. That is, first, specific identities are created when social relations are depicted. This is clear from all three of the analyses before us. But second, concrete individuals must come to identify with these subject-positions and so with the representations in which they appear. Once they do so identify, the representations, and the power relations and interests entailed in them, are naturalized. As a result, the representations appear as common sense, as reflecting ‘the way the world really is.’ The ‘naturalizing’ functions attributed to discourses are not automatic: they require a successful interpellation of their audience(s).

In discussions of U.S. national interest, for example, it is the ‘United States’ that occupies the central subject-position. Most fundamentally, of course, this representation establishes the existence of ‘the United States’ *as* a subject. Out of a political abstraction designating a territory, a population, and a set of governing principles and apparatuses is created an anthropomorphization, an apparently acting subject with motives and interests. Furthermore, these representations establish the U.S. as a particular *kind* of subject, with a specific identity and the attendant interests. But, as noted above, concrete individuals must recognize themselves in these representations. To this end, representations of ‘the U.S.’ draw on a ‘representation of belonging’ (Tomlinson, 1991: 81) to an imagined American community (Anderson, 1991). Through this representation, aided by state officials’ pervasive use of ‘we’ in describing the policies and actions of the U.S. state, individuals are interpellated as belonging to ‘the U.S.’ The success of the interpellations forged is clear, in the case of the U.S., from the ubiquitous

¹¹ I draw here on Weldes, 1996, 1999.

deployment of this 'we' by ordinary Americans in discussing actions taken by the U.S. state.¹²

The process of interpellation is facilitated by the multiple subject-positions into which concrete individuals can be interpellated. U.S. foreign policy discourse, for example, interpellates Americans into diverse, already familiar, subject-positions. In addition to 'we, the U.S.,' they are simultaneously hailed into such comfortable identities as the 'freedom-loving democrat' who opposes communism, the 'concerned American patriot' who believes 'we' should protect Americans abroad, and the 'civilized westerner' who is appalled by the excesses of Middle Eastern terrorism.

A different way to get at this – one which explicitly recognizes that not all audiences, or parts of audiences, are successfully interpellated – is to draw on the cultural studies literature on audience reception. One could, for example, begin with Stuart Hall's analysis (1980) of at least three major 'decoding' positions through which readers engage with and produce meaning out of texts: a dominant-hegemonic position 'takes the connotated meaning ... and decodes the message in terms of the reference code in which it has been encoded,' thus producing a reading that functions within the dominant code (p. 136); a negotiated position 'contains a mixture of adaptive and oppositional elements' in which the former define the parameters of interpretation while the latter allow for local criticisms (p. 137); an oppositional position recognizes the dominant interpretation, but rejects it in favor of an alternative reading, for example, one that

12. The use of 'we' to mean 'the U.S.' and, specifically, actions taken by the U.S. state, is pervasive in American culture. It can be observed in public fora such as newspaper editorials and television interviews in which journalists, politicians, and 'ordinary' folk routinely refer to 'the U.S.' as 'we'. In discussion with colleagues about this phenomenon, it has become apparent that university students are also widely prone to use this locution. An interesting research question concerns the extent to which this intimate identification of individual citizens with the state and state policy is unique to the U.S. On the basis of anecdotal evidence provided by friends and colleagues from diverse cultural backgrounds, including in particular Canada, India, and New Zealand, and recent personal experience in England, this intimacy looks to be a peculiarly American phenomenon or, at least, to be more prevalent in the U.S. than elsewhere. If this is true, then the interpellation of individuals in other states either is accomplished on other grounds or is not accomplished as successfully as it is in the U.S.

dismisses a narrative built around ‘the national interest’ as an ideological cloak for class interest (p. 138). With such an analysis we might discover, hypothetically, that while the U.S. public was successfully hailed into the U.S. discourse on the Philippines, and the Philippine government relied on a negotiated reading that accepted the basic premises while challenging specific applications, the average Filipino took a cynical, oppositional reading in which the U.S. ‘assistance’ was a cover for a neo-imperialist invasion.

Or maybe not – but audience readings now become an empirical question rather than an implicit assumption. That is, whatever approach one adopts, such analyses have the virtue of raising as empirical questions the extent to which diverse audiences of discourses of identity actually buy, are convinced by, and come to speak, the state discourses on which we as discourse analysts tend to focus our attention. Which raises the issue of our disciplinary focus on privileged, elite discourses.

2. Elite versus popular discourses of identity¹³

Although it has been argued that we live in a time when ‘the political and the cultural can no longer be decoupled’ (Dean, 2000: 2), studies of world politics – even those examining discourse -- generally devote their attention to ‘high politics,’ eschewing the ‘low politics’, or non-politics, of popular culture. The discursive practices of the state, its managers, and other elites (including academics) receive the lion’s share of attention. Thus, Roxanne’s study of ‘imperial encounters’ highlights ‘the ways in which the South has been discursively represented by policy makers, scholars, and journalists in the North’ (1996: 2), Iver investigates Norwegian politicians with local, regional and national mandates, and Ido correlates the discourse of the U.S. state with that

¹³ This discussion draws heavily from Weldes, 2003.

of the most prominent, discipline-defining American political scientists. Others do the same. Carol Cohn's (1987) path breaking analysis of 'technostrategic language' illuminates the highly gendered argot of nuclear strategy deployed by 'defense intellectuals'; David Campbell's (1992) analysis of writing U.S. security focuses on foreign policy discourse; and my own (1999) analysis of the construction of the Cuban missile crisis also concentrates on the discursive practices of U.S. state officials.

Nonetheless, popular culture – by which I mean both culture produced by the people and mass culture commercially produced for mass consumption -- properly comprises a substantial element in the field of meanings through which world politics are constructed. Although the term 'culture' is highly contested (Williams, 1983: 160), we can fruitfully think of culture as 'the context within which people give meaning to their actions and experiences and make sense of their lives' (Tomlinson, 1991: 7). Culture, in this sense, is a process or a set of practices, including representations, language, and customs, that are 'concerned with the production and the exchange of meanings -- the "giving and taking of meaning" -- between members of a society or group' (Hall, 1997: 2). Understood in this way, culture encompasses the multiplicity of discourses through which meanings are constructed and contested and practices (re)produced. In Stuart Hall's words, culture encompasses 'the contradictory forms of "common sense" which have taken root in and helped to shape popular life' (1986: 26). This is at least as true of popular culture as it is of any other element or aspect of culture.

Indeed, popular culture often helps to create and sustain the conditions for contemporary world politics. As Michael Shapiro has argued, 'with the exception of some resistant forms, music, theater, TV weather forecasts, and even cereal box scripts tend to endorse prevailing power structures by helping to reproduce the beliefs and allegiances necessary for their

uncontested functioning' (1992: 1). U.S. popular culture in the mid 1980s, for instance, helped to 'redeem Vietnam and Teheran' with such films as *Rambo: First Blood, Part II* (1985) and what Ronnie Lipschutz (2001: 146) dubbed the 'techno-twit novels' of Tom Clancy, such as *The Hunt for Red October* (1984) and *Red Storm Rising* (1986). Conversely, it is possible (if less likely) for popular culture to challenge the boundaries of common sense, to contest the taken-for-granted. That is, while prevailing cultural practices constrain and oppress people, popular culture simultaneously provides 'resources to fight against those constraints' (John Fiske, in Nelson, Treichler, and Grossberg, 1992: 5). The film *Dr. Strangelove* (1964) is a classic example, ridiculing, among other things, anti-communist paranoia and the convolutions of nuclear deterrence; *Canadian Bacon* (1995) and *South Park* (1999) are others, deriding U.S. jingoism and warmongering. Sometimes, perhaps even often, popular culture both supports and challenges the common sense of world politics. The film *Starship Troopers* (1997), for instance, can be read as simultaneously subverting conventional narratives of security by showing how knowledge of the enemy and the self is created and secured, while nonetheless reproducing the very self/other distinction on which contemporary world politics is based (Whitehall, 2003).

Whether a particular popular cultural text supports or undermines existing relations of power, or does both at once, examining such texts helps us to highlight the workings of power. A focus on the discourses of popular culture in addition to the elites discourses of the state and its ideological apparatuses – e.g., the media, academia -- allows us to 'pluralize' world politics by multiplying 'the sites and categories that "count" as political' (Dean, 2000: 4). Popular discourses, then, as also deserving of serious analysis, which raises another question, namely, the relationship between and among different discourses, whether popular, elite or otherwise.

3. *Intertextuality in discourses of identity*¹⁴

Taking a cue from Roxanne, I want to suggest that we should make more use of the notion of intertextuality.¹⁵ This concept draws our attention to the fact that texts -- whether the high politics documents of foreign policy, the textbooks of political science, or the products of popular culture -- are never read in isolation. They wouldn't make sense if they were. Instead, 'any one text is necessarily read in relationship to others and . . . a range of textual knowledges is brought to bear upon it' (Fiske, 1987: 108). In a slightly different terminology, all signs are multi-accentual: their meaning depends on how they are articulated to other signs and sign systems, and how they are articulated to social relations (Vološinov, 1986: 23). To poach from Bakhtin, we might say that each text "tastes of the . . . contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life" (1981: 293).

So, if we want to know how discourses of identity are understood – that is, how audiences make meaning out of them, whether through dominant, negotiated or oppositional readings – we need to investigate the other texts in relation to which the identity discourses are read. On the one hand, then, examining intertextual relations means, as already noted above, looking at the relations between and among different types or genres of texts – popular culture, academic, journalistic, policy making. Whatever combination of textual genres we investigate, we can look for different types of relations among them.

- We might, for example, look for overt references from one text to another. As Constance Penley has demonstrated, NASA poaches from *Star Trek*, and vice versa. For instance, the first U.S. space shuttle, initially to be called *The Constitution*, was in fact christened *The Enterprise*--in honor of *Star Trek*'s flagship--after a letter-writing campaign by *Star Trek* fans induced President Gerald Ford to direct NASA to change the name (1997: 18-19). This same NASA shuttle *Enterprise* then found its way back to *Star Trek*: it appears in the succession of ships called *Enterprise* shown in the

¹⁴ This section also draws heavily on Weldes, 2003.

¹⁵ Kristeva (1980) first introduced the notion of intertextuality.

montage that opens each episode of the fifth *Star Trek* series, *Enterprise*. *Star Wars* is similarly intertextual. After President Ronald Reagan called for research into defenses that could ‘intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies,’ thus rendering ‘nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete’ (Reagan, 1983), SDI critics in Congress lampooned Reagan’s vision of a defensive military umbrella, successfully relabeling it *Star Wars* after George Lucas’s block-buster SF movie (1977) (Smith, nd.).

- We can also investigate similarities in the way world politics is officially and popularly narrated. For instance, texts like *The Economist* and its descriptions and promotions of globalization are read in relation to other texts, including SF and its futuristic images of ‘spaceship Earth’ (e.g., Hooper, 2001). Broad intertextual knowledges -- the culture’s ‘image bank,’ including generic SF narratives and conventional SF tropes -- ‘pre-orient’ readers, guiding them to make meanings in some ways rather than in others (Fiske, 1987: 108). *The Economist*’s discourse of globalization might garner a dominant reading in light of techno-utopian SF, making it look not only plausible -- we are entering a glorious high-tech future -- but benign and downright praiseworthy -- this future promises benefits for everyone (e.g., Ruggiero, 1996). But like all signs, ‘globalization’ is multi-accentual. The same pro-globalization text, read in light of techno-dystopic SF, might produce an oppositional reading, one in which globalization brings with it rule by transnational corporations and organized crime, rampant violence, shocking squalor, and vast inequalities in wealth and life chances.
- We might, on the other hand, look for deeper metaphysical--epistemological and ontological--overlap across different texts and genres. Structural homologies often extend to the most basic assumptions: the nature of Self and Other, the character of knowledge, the possibilities of knowing the Self, or the Other, the nature of and relations between good and evil, the possibilities for community. We might, for instance, examine *Buffy, the Vampire Slayer* and find a tale of sovereignty and a discourse of struggles to establish a community identity (Molloy, 2003) or examine *Star Trek*’s changing representations of the Borg to shed light on to the inability of American identity discourses to countenance the possibility of genuine ‘collective identity’ (Jackson and Nexon, 2003).
- Finally, we might look for attempts in one genre – i.e., policy making -- actually to implement visions from another. Future war fiction provides scenarios and nova -- such as cyborgs -- now actively being implemented in the technophilic Revolution in Military Affairs (e.g., De Landa, 1991). Cyberpunk helped to shape ‘information society’ (e.g., Tomas, 1991). William Gibson’s *Neuromancer*, for instance, ‘provided . . . the imaginal public sphere and reconfigured discursive community that established the grounding for the possibility of a new kind of interaction’ (Stone, 1991: 95). In shaping technological development, cyberpunk has helped to articulate ‘new geographical imaginations of emerging spaces like the Internet’ (Kitchin and Kneale, 2001: 23). But the attempt to put fictional visions into practice is not always straightforward. Although William Gibson portrays the future as dark and violent, a

despotic future ruled by massive MNCs, some analysts and politicians have actively drawn on Gibson ‘to justify investment in information and communications technologies’ (*ibid.*: 24). Gibson notes the irony: ‘I was delighted when scientists and corporate technicians started to read me, but I soon realized that all the critical pessimistic left-wing stuff just goes over their heads. The social and political naiveté of modern corporate boffins is frightening, they read me and just take bits, all the cute technology, and miss about fifteen levels of irony’ (in *ibid.*). If this seems far-fetched, we need only look back to political science. Development theory and modernization theory in particular, Roxanne notes, offered visions of U.S. and others’ identities – the U.S. as moral, rational, efficient, honest and the Philippines as chaotic, instable, corrupt, inefficient -- that U.S. counterinsurgency policy was designed actively and explicitly to implement.

‘Studying a text’s intertextual relations,’ then, ‘can provide us with valuable clues to the readings that a particular culture or subculture is likely to produce from it’ (Fiske, 1987: 108), which readings are likely to be considered plausible, and even which political contestations are likely to arise. By examining the relations between different texts and discourses, we can begin to unravel some of the complicated and interlinked conventions through which discourses of identity are made meaningful.

4. Institutionalization of discourses of identity in specific bureaucratic institutions

Changing tack completely, I want to raise two more conventional, ‘materialist’ directions for further research. Ido’s analysis of the embeddedness of major academic discourse producers in policy making bureaucracies alerts us to the fact of institutional power: those academics with institutional, bureaucratic connections to the state are, unsurprisingly, often influential in defining the agendas, concepts, and directions of the discipline. Iver’s analysis also recognizes the importance of bureaucratic institutions, highlighting the importance of bureaucratic power and SOPs in resolving the tensions generated by the innovative practices and subject-positions called into being by the novel story of the Barents Region.

Both of these examples raise questions about the conceptualization in analyses of discourses of identity of both power and institutions. While Foucault's notion of discursive power as productive of subject positions or identities is enormously useful, it should not be allowed to override consideration for other forms of power. Power is not solely a matter of discursive (i.e., textual, linguistic) constitution. Some discourses are more powerful as a result of their location in pre-existing (but not non-discursive) institutions. As Iver notes, complex inter-layering and inter-action of bureaucratic practices, rules, and apparatuses can significantly affect the outcomes of struggles over identity. Some institutions, like the foreign policy apparatuses that comprise the U.S. national security state, are constitutionally – that is, also discursively – constituted as the locus of foreign policy decision making. When such discursive practices are sedimented in institutional apparatuses, they take on their own force: those individuals who inhabit the offices of the state can legitimately and authoritatively speak for the state. Their discourses, in short, have more clout.

Investigating the interconnections between discourses of identity and their institutional locations, their embeddedness (or not), their implication in institutional hierarchies and rivalries, and so on, will extend our understanding of the politics of discourses of identity. It can help us to understand which discourses are likely (although not predetermined) to win in contests of meaning and identity construction.

5. Relations between discourses of state identity and other discursive structures

Finally, all of these authors highlight power and the power/knowledge nexus within discursive practices. But as Cynthia Enloe reminds us, ‘Hierarchies [that is, relations of power] are multiple because forms of political power are diverse’ (1996: 193). They might, for example, rest on the sorts of discursive, hierarchy producing relations that Roxanne points to, or the SOP’s of bureaucratic practices that Iver highlights, or the embedded academics in Ido’s analysis of political science. Discursive production of and contestation over identity is very likely to involve other forms of politics: class relations, gender relations, race relations, colonial relations, and so on, may impinge on the politics of discourses of identity. Conversely, as Gearóid Ó Tuathail has argued, ‘Questions of identity may insinuate their way into all forms of politics, but all forms of politics are not about questions of identity’ (1996: 652). This, then, raises questions about the relationship between different forms of politics. How do discourses of identity – understood and both linguistic and non-linguistic practices – interact with other forms of discourse, other forms of practice, other structures, like those of patriarchy or capitalism?

Put in a different way, Enloe argues that different ‘hierarchies of power’ – whether of gender, class, race, or what have you – ‘do not sit on the social landscape like tuna, egg, and cheese sandwiches on an icy cafeteria counter, diversely multiple but unconnected. They relate to each other, sometimes in ways that subvert one another, sometimes in ways that provide each with their respective resiliency. The bedroom’s hierarchy is not unconnected to the hierarchies of the international coffee exchange or of the foreign ministry’ (1996: 193). The relations among and between different discourses of identity and different hierarchies, or relations, of power, need to be examined in much more detail, as difficult and daunting as that might be. Otherwise,

the ‘preoccupation with the politics of identity can create a history without materialism, a history without economic exploitation, capital accumulation and power applied for the instrumental purposes of economic gain’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 652), indeed, a history without any of the other hierarchies of power we certainly don’t want to ignore.

Conclusion: Locating Power

In her brilliant discussion of power in world politics, Cynthia Enloe argued that, while much of IR scholarship has been obsessed with power, the discipline has in fact dramatically ‘*underestim[ed]* the amounts and varieties of power it takes to form and sustain any given set of relationships between states’ (1996: 186). She criticizes in particular the tendency of IR scholars to study the powerful -- states, for instance -- on the assumption that such a focus will provide insights into and explanations of world politics. In contrast, she argues that if we focus on the ‘margins, silences and bottom rungs’ (ibid.: 188), we can see the myriad forms and the astonishing amounts of power that are required for the system – including those states -- to exist at all. My arguments here take inspiration from Enloe. Whilst analyses of discourse and identity are more attentive to more aspects of power than is the mainstream of either Political Science or International Relations -- Roxanne in particular is very explicit about the productive aspects of power, its ability to produce the subjects who speak and about whom we speak -- we have not gone far enough. We need still to widen our understanding of power, to lower our sights to the mundane or quotidian, and to recognize the complex interactions among discourse, institutions, and material structures of power.

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